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Summa Theologica, Second Part of the
Second Part
Question 33. Fraternal
correction
Is fraternal
correction an act of charity?
Is it a matter of
precept?
Does this precept
bind all, or only superiors?
Does this precept
bind the subject to correct his
superior?
May a sinner correct
anyone?
Should one correct a
person who becomes worse
through being corrected?
Should secret
correction precede denouncement?
Should witnesses be
called before denouncement?
Article 1. Whether
fraternal
correction is an act of charity?
Objection 1.
It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of charity. For a
gloss on Matthew 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend against thee,"
says that "a man should reprove his brother out of zeal for justice."
But justice is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore fraternal
correction is an act, not of charity, but of justice.
Objection 2.
Further, fraternal correction is given by secret admonition. Now
admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of prudence, for a
prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of prudence.
Objection 3.
Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue. Now it is an
act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Galatians 6:2: "Bear
ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ,"
which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the correction of
a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with him, is not an act
of charity.
On the contrary,
To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed. But almsdeeds are
works of charity, as stated above (Question 32, Article 1). Therefore
fraternal correction is an act of charity.
I answer that,
The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which should be employed
against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be considered in two ways,
first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing to the harm
of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by being detrimental to
the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by that man's sin.
Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which
applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner
himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is
directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone's
evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's good
is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well.
Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because
thereby we drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of which
pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external loss, or of
a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of virtue is more akin
to charity than the good of the body or of external things. Therefore
fraternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing of a
bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily need. There is
another correction which applies a remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer,
considered as hurtful to others, and especially to the common good.
This correction is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard
the rectitude of justice between one man and another.
Reply to Objection 1.
This gloss speaks of the second correction which is an act of justice.
Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it takes justice as
denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further on (58, 5), in
which sense again all "sin is iniquity" (1 John 3:4), through being
contrary to justice.
Reply to Objection 2.
According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), prudence regulates
whatever is directed to the end, about which things counsel and choice
are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we perform some
action aright which is directed to the end of some virtue, such as
temperance or fortitude, that action belongs chiefly to the virtue to
whose end it is directed. Since, then, the admonition which is given in
fraternal correction is directed to the removal of a brother's sin,
which removal pertains to charity, it is evident that this admonition
is chiefly an act of charity, which virtue commands it, so to speak,
but secondarily an act of prudence, which executes and directs the
action.
Reply to Objection 3.
Fraternal correction is not opposed to forbearance with the weak, on
the contrary it results from it. For a man bears with a sinner, in so
far as he is not disturbed against him, and retains his goodwill
towards him: the result being that he strives to make him do better.
Article 2. Whether
fraternal
correction is a matter of precept?
Objection 1.
It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter of precept. For
nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according to the saying of
Jerome [Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: "Accursed be he who says that
God has commanded any. thing impossible." Now it is written
(Ecclesiastes 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can
correct whom He hath despised." Therefore fraternal correction is not a
matter of precept.
Objection 2. Further,
all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to the precepts of the
Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come under any precept of
the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of precept.
Objection 3.
Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin, which has no
place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are found to omit
fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "Not
only those of low degree, but also those of high position, refrain from
reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity, not by the claims of
charity." Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.
Objection 4.
Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due. If,
therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due to
our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man owes
anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he must
not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek him
out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go seeking
for those who need correction, in order that we might correct them;
which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great number
of sinners, for whose correction one man could not suffice, and because
religious would have to leave the cloister in order to reprove men,
which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal correction is not a
matter of precept.
On the contrary, Augustine
says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): "You become worse than the sinner if you
fail to correct him." But this would not be so unless, by this neglect,
one omitted to observe some precept. Therefore fraternal correction is
a matter of precept.
I answer that, Fraternal
correction is a matter of precept. We must observe, however, that while
the negative precepts of the Law forbid sinful acts, the positive
precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now sinful acts are evil in
themselves, and cannot become good, no matter how, or when, or where,
they are done, because of their very nature they are connected with an
evil end, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore negative precepts bind
always and for all times. On the other hand, acts of virtue must not be
done anyhow, but by observing the due circumstances, which are
requisite in order that an act be virtuous; namely, that it be done
where, when, and how it ought to be done. And since the disposition of
whatever is directed to the end depends on the formal aspect of the
end, the chief of these circumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect
of the end, which in this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such
a circumstance be omitted from a virtuous act, as entirely takes away
the good of virtue, such an act is contrary to a precept. If, however,
the circumstance omitted from a virtuous act be such as not to destroy
the virtue altogether, though it does not perfectly attain the good of
virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,
9) says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not contrary
to the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the mean virtue is
destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction is directed to a
brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of precept, in so far as it
is necessary for that end, but not so as we have to correct our erring
brother at all places and times.
Reply to Objection
1. In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious without
the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his power. Hence
Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we ignore who is
predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our feelings, that
we wish all to be saved." Consequently we ought to do our brethren the
kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's help.
Reply to Objection
2. As stated above (32, 5, ad 4), all the precepts about
rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the precept about the
honor due to parents.
Reply to Objection
3. Fraternal correction may be omitted in three ways.
First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct someone.
For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man refrains from chiding
and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable time for so
doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may become worse,
or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others who are weak
and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and virtue, this does
not seem to result from covetousness, but to be counselled by charity."
Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one
commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in the same passage)
"one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous pain
or death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by such
things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity." This
would seem to be the case when a man reckons that he might probably
withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so, through fear
or covetousness.
Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or
covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults, and yet
not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw him
from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or
covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to
these things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to correct
wrongdoers.
Reply to Objection
4. We are bound to pay that which is due to some fixed and
certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good, without
waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to find him.
Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should seek him,
when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he that has
spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in order to
reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound to seek
someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any certain
person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those favors be
material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow them when
the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance. For this reason
he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that "Our Lord warns us not to be
listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by being on the
lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting what we see": else
we should become spies on the lives of others, which is against the
saying of Proverbs 24:19: "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness
in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest." It is evident from this
that there is no need for religious to leave their cloister in order to
rebuke evil-doers.
Article 3. Whether
fraternal
correction belongs only to prelates?
Objection 1.
It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone. For
Jerome [Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: "Let priests endeavor to
fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother sin against thee,'"
etc. Now prelates having charge of others were usually designated under
the name of priests. Therefore it seems that fraternal correction
belongs to prelates alone.
Objection 2. Further,
fraternal correction is a spiritual alms. Now corporal almsgiving
belongs to those who are placed above others in temporal matters, i.e.
to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction belongs to those who are
placed above others in spiritual matters, i.e. to prelates.
Objection 3.
Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his rebuke to
something better. Now in the physical order the inferior is moved by
the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which follows the
order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct inferiors.
On the contrary,
It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can. Tam Sacerdotes): "Both priests
and all the rest of the faithful should be most solicitous for those
who perish, so that their reproof may either correct their sinful ways.
or, if they be incorrigible, cut them off from the Church."
I answer that,
As stated above (Article 1), correction is twofold. One is an act of
charity, which seeks in a special way the recovery of an erring brother
by means of a simple warning: such like correction belongs to anyone
who has charity, be he subject or prelate.
But there is another correction which is an act of justice purposing
the common good, which is procured not only by warning one's brother,
but also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may, through fear,
desist from sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose
business it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by means of
punishments.
Reply to Objection 1.
Even as regards that fraternal correction which is common to all,
prelates have a grave responsibility, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i,
9): "for just as a man ought to bestow temporal favors on those
especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought he to confer
spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and the like, on those
who are entrusted to his spiritual care." Therefore Jerome does not
mean that the precept of fraternal correction concerns priests only,
but that it concerns them chiefly.
Reply to Objection 2.
Just as he who has the means wherewith to give corporal assistance is
rich in this respect, so he whose reason is gifted with a sane
judgment, so as to be able to correct another's wrong-doing, is, in
this respect, to be looked on as a superior.
Reply to Objection 3.
Even in the physical order certain things act mutually on one another,
through being in some respect higher than one another, in so far as
each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in potentiality with regard to
another. On like manner one man can correct another in so far as he has
a sane judgment in a matter wherein the other sins, though he is not
his superior simply.
Article 4. Whether a
man is bound to
correct his prelate?
Objection 1. It
would seem that no man is bound to correct his prelate. For it is
written (Exodus 19:12): "The beast that shall touch the mount shall be
stoned," [Vulgate: 'Everyone that shall touch the mount, dying he shall
die.'] and (2 Samuel 6:7) it is related that the Lord struck Oza for
touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark signify our prelates.
Therefore prelates should not be corrected by their subjects.
Objection 2.
Further, a gloss on Galatians 2:11, "I withstood him to the face,"
adds: "as an equal." Therefore, since a subject is not equal to his
prelate, he ought not to correct him.
Objection 3.
Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that "one ought not to presume
to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one thinks better of
oneself." But one ought not to think better of oneself than of one's
prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct one's prelate.
On the contrary,
Augustine says in his Rule: "Show mercy not only to yourselves, but
also to him who, being in the higher position among you, is therefore
in greater danger." But fraternal correction is a work of mercy.
Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.
I answer that,
A subject is not competent to administer to his prelate the correction
which is an act of justice through the coercive nature of punishment:
but the fraternal correction which is an act of charity is within the
competency of everyone in respect of any person towards whom he is
bound by charity, provided there be something in that person which
requires correction.
Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to whatever is
contained under the object of that power or habit: thus vision extends
to all things comprised in the object of sight. Since, however, a
virtuous act needs to be moderated by due circumstances, it follows
that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do so in a
becoming manner, not with impudence and harshness, but with gentleness
and respect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Timothy 5:1): "An ancient man
rebuke not, but entreat him as a father." Wherefore Dionysius finds
fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for rebuking a priest with
insolence, by striking and turning him out of the church.
Reply to Objection 1.
It would seem that a subject touches his prelate inordinately when he
upbraids him with insolence, as also when he speaks ill of him: and
this is signified by God's condemnation of those who touched the mount
and the ark.
Reply to Objection 2.
To withstand anyone in public exceeds the mode of fraternal correction,
and so Paul would not have withstood Peter then, unless he were in some
way his equal as regards the defense of the faith. But one who is not
an equal can reprove privately and respectfully. Hence the Apostle in
writing to the Colossians (4:17) tells them to admonish their prelate:
"Say to Archippus: Fulfil thy ministry [Vulgate: 'Take heed to the
ministry which thou hast received in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.'
Cf. 2 Timothy 4:5." It must be observed, however, that if the faith
were endangered, a subject ought to rebuke his prelate even publicly.
Hence Paul, who was Peter's subject, rebuked him in public, on account
of the imminent danger of scandal concerning faith, and, as the gloss
of Augustine says on Galatians 2:11, "Peter gave an example to
superiors, that if at any time they should happen to stray from the
straight path, they should not disdain to be reproved by their
subjects."
Reply to Objection
3. To presume oneself to be simply better than one's prelate,
would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but there is no presumption
in thinking oneself better in some respect, because, in this life, no
man is without some fault. We must also remember that when a man
reproves his prelate charitably, it does not follow that he thinks
himself any better, but merely that he offers his help to one who,
"being in the higher position among you, is therefore in greater
danger," as Augustine observes in his Rule quoted above.
Article 5. Whether a
sinner ought to
reprove a wrongdoer?
Objection 1. It
would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer. For no man is
excused from obeying a precept by having committed a sin. But fraternal
correction is a matter of precept, as stated above (Article 2).
Therefore it seems that a man ought not to forbear from such like
correction for the reason that he has committed a sin.
Objection 2.
Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than corporal
almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from
administering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account
of a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.
Objection 3.
Further, it is written (1 John 1:8): "If we say that we have no sin, we
deceive ourselves." Therefore if, on account of a sin, a man is
hindered from reproving his brother, there will be none to reprove the
wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable: therefore the
former is also.
On the contrary,
Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): "He that is subject to vice
should not correct the vices of others." Again it is written (Romans
2:1): "Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself. For thou
dost the same things which thou judgest."
I answer that, As
stated above (3, ad 2), to correct a wrongdoer belongs to a man, in so
far as his reason is gifted with right judgment. Now sin, as stated
above (I-II, 85, 1,2), does not destroy the good of nature so as to
deprive the sinner's reason of all right judgment, and in this respect
he may be competent to find fault with others for committing sin.
Nevertheless a previous sin proves somewhat of a hindrance to this
correction, for three reasons. First because this previous sin renders
a man unworthy to rebuke another; and especially is he unworthy to
correct another for a lesser sin, if he himself has committed a
greater. Hence Jerome says on the words, "Why seest thou the mote?"
etc. (Matthew 7:3): "He is speaking of those who, while they are
themselves guilty of mortal sin, have no patience with the lesser sins
of their brethren."
Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the
scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector's sin be well known,
because it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more
for the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Matthew 7:4, "How
sayest thou to thy brother?" etc. are expounded by Chrysostom [Hom.
xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]
thus: "That is--'With what object?' Out of charity, think you, that you
may save your neighbor?" No, "because you would look after your own
salvation first. What you want is, not to save others, but to hide your
evil deeds with good teaching, and to seek to be praised by men for
your knowledge."
Thirdly, on account of the rebuker's pride; when, for instance, a man
thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart, sets himself
above his neighbor, judging the latter's sins with harsh severity, as
though he himself were just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte ii, 19): "To reprove the faults of others is the duty of good and
kindly men: when a wicked man rebukes anyone, his rebuke is the
latter's acquittal." And so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
ii, 19): "When we have to find fault with anyone, we should think
whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must remember that
we are men, and might have been guilty of it; or that we once had it on
our conscience, but have it no longer: and then we should bethink
ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our reproof may be the
outcome, not of hatred, but of pity.
But if we find that we are guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke
him, but groan with him, and invite him to repent with us." It follows
from this that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does
not sin, nor does he bring a further condemnation on himself, although
thereby he proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his
brother's or in his own conscience, on account of his previous sin.
Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
Article 6. Whether
one ought to
forbear from correcting someone, through fear lest he become worse?
Objection 1.
It would seem that one ought not to forbear from correcting someone
through fear lest he become worse. For sin is weakness of the soul,
according to Psalm 6:3: "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now
he that has charge of a sick person, must not cease to take care of
him, even if he be fractious or contemptuous, because then the danger
is greater, as in the case of madmen. Much more, therefore should one
correct a sinner, no matter how badly he takes it.
Objection 2.
Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not to be foregone on
account of scandal. Now God's commandments are vital truths. Since,
therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as stated above
(Article 2), it seems that it should not be foregone for fear of
scandalizing the person to be corrected.
Objection 3. Further,
according to the Apostle (Romans 3:8) we should not do evil that good
may come of it. Therefore, in like manner, good should not be omitted
lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a good thing. Therefore
it should not be omitted for fear lest the person corrected become
worse.
On the contrary,
It is written (Proverbs 9:8): "Rebuke not a scorner lest he hate thee,"
where a gloss remarks: "You must not fear lest the scorner insult you
when you rebuke him: rather should you bear in mind that by making him
hate you, you may make him worse." Therefore one ought to forego
fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may make a man worse.
I answer that,
As stated above (Article 3) the correction of the wrongdoer is twofold.
One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed to the common good, has
coercive force. Such correction should not be omitted lest the person
corrected be disturbed, both because if he is unwilling to amend his
ways of his own accord, he should be made to cease sinning by being
punished, and because, if he be incorrigible, the common good is
safeguarded in this way, since the order of justice is observed, and
others are deterred by one being made an example of. Hence a judge does
not desist from pronouncing sentence of condemnation against a sinner,
for fear of disturbing him or his friends.
The other fraternal correction is directed to the amendment of the
wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely admonishes. Consequently
when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take the warning,
and will become worse, such fraternal correction should be foregone,
because the means should be regulated according to the requirements of
the end.
Reply to Objection 1.
The doctor uses force towards a madman, who is unwilling to submit to
his treatment; and this may be compared with the correction
administered by prelates, which has coercive power, but not with simple
fraternal correction.
Reply to Objection 2.
Fraternal correction is a matter of precept, in so far as it is an act
of virtue, and it will be a virtuous act in so far as it is
proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever it is a hindrance to
the end, for instance when a man becomes worse through it, it is longer
a vital truth, nor is it a matter precept.
Reply to Objection
3. Whatever is directed to end, becomes good through being
directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction hinders the
end, namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer good, so that
when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted lest evil should
befall.
Article 7. Whether
the precept of
fraternal correction demands that a private admonition should precede
denunciation?
Objection 1.
It would seem that the precept of fraternal correction does not demand
that a private admonition should precede denunciation. For, in works of
charity, we should above all follow the example of God, according to
Ephesians 5:1-2: "Be ye followers of God, as most dear children, and
walk in love." Now God sometimes punishes a man for a sin, without
previously warning him in secret. Therefore it seems that there is no
need for a private admonition to precede denunciation.
Objection 2.
Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn from the
deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the commandments of Holy
Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find that a hidden sin is
publicly denounced, without any previous admonition in private. Thus we
read (Genesis 37:2) that "Joseph accused his brethren to his father of
a most wicked crime": and (Acts 5:4-9) that Peter publicly denounced
Ananias and Saphira who had secretly "by fraud kept back the price of
the land," without beforehand admonishing them in private: nor do we
read that Our Lord admonished Judas in secret before denouncing him.
Therefore the precept does not require that secret admonition should
precede public denunciation.
Objection 3. Further,
it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce. Now one may go to the
length of accusing a person publicly, without previously admonishing
him in secret: for it is decided in the Decretal (Cap. Qualiter, xiv,
De Accusationibus) that "nothing else need precede accusation except
inscription." [The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se
inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or
inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove
the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have
to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore it seems that the precept does
not require that a secret admonition should precede public denunciation.
Objection 4. Further,
it does not seem probable that the customs observed by religious in
general are contrary to the precepts of Christ. Now it is customary
among religious orders to proclaim this or that one for a fault,
without any previous secret admonition. Therefore it seems that this
admonition is not required by the precept.
Objection 5.
Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a prelate
sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in particular, to
tell him if they know of anything that requires correction. Therefore
it would seem that they are bound to tell them this, even before any
secret admonition. Therefore the precept does not require secret
admonition before public denunciation.
On the contrary,
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the words, "Rebuke him between
thee and him alone" (Matthew 18:15): "Aiming at his amendment, while
avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from shame he might begin to
defend his sin; and him whom you thought to make a better man, you make
worse." Now we are bound by the precept of charity to beware lest our
brother become worse. Therefore the order of fraternal correction comes
under the precept.
I answer that,
With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is necessary to make
a distinction: because sins may be either public or secret. On the case
of public sins, a remedy is required not only for the sinner, that he
may become better, but also for others, who know of his sin, lest they
be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should be denounced in public,
according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Timothy 5:20): "Them that sin
reprove before all, that the rest also may have fear," which is to be
understood as referring to public sins, as Augustine states (De Verb.
Dom. xvi, 7).
On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord
seem to apply (Matthew 18:15): "If thy brother shall offend against
thee," etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others,
he no longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he
'disturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense even at
his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further distinction.
For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor either in his body
or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots secretly to betray
his country to its enemies, or when a heretic secretly turns other men
away from the faith. And since he that sins thus in secret, sins not
only against you in particular, but also against others, it is
necessary to take steps to denounce him at once, in order to prevent
him doing such harm, unless by chance you were firmly persuaded that
this evil result would be prevented by admonishing him secretly. On the
other hand there are other sins which injure none but the sinner, and
the person sinned against, either because he alone is hurt by the
sinner, or at least because he alone knows about his sin, and then our
one purpose should be to succor our sinning brother: and just as the
physician of the body restores the sick man to health, if possible,
without cutting off a limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a
limb which is least indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the
whole body, so too he who desires his brother's amendment should, if
possible, so amend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good
name.
For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not only
in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he lose his
good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are restrained
from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man finds his
honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome says on
Matthew 18:15: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke him in
private, lest he persist in his sin if he should once become shameless
or unabashed." Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning brother's
good name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the dishonor of
others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad pleb. Hipponens.
lxxviii): "When a few of those who bear a name for holiness are
reported falsely or proved in truth to have done anything wrong, people
will seek by busily repeating it to make it believed of all": and also
because when one man's sin is made public others are incited to sin
likewise.
Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name,
Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so
deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his good
name. Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret
admonition to precede public denunciation.
Reply to Objection 1.
Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore hidden sins are to the
judgment of God, just what public sins are to the judgment of man.
Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by secretly admonishing
them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration, either while they wake
or while they sleep, according to Job 33:15-17: "By a dream in a vision
by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men . . . then He openeth the
ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn,
that He may withdraw a man from the things he is doing."
Reply to Objection 2.
Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though it were public,
wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He did not, but
warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The sin of Ananias
and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's executor, by Whose
revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to Joseph it is probable
that he warned his brethren, though Scripture does not say so. Or we
may say that the sin was public with regard to his brethren, wherefore
it is stated in the plural that he accused "his brethren."
Reply to Objection 3.
When there is danger to a great number of people, those words of Our
Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not sin against thee
alone.
Reply to Objection 4.
Proclamations made in the chapter of religious are about little faults
which do not affect a man's good name, wherefore they are reminders of
forgotten faults rather than accusations or denunciations. If, however,
they should be of such a nature as to injure our brother's good name,
it would be contrary to Our Lord's precept, to denounce a brother's
fault in this manner.
Reply to Objection 5.
A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a Divine precept, according
to Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather then men." Therefore when a
prelate commands anyone to tell him anything that he knows to need
correction, the command rightly understood supports the safeguarding of
the order of fraternal correction, whether the command be addressed to
all in general, or to some particular individual. If, on the other
hand, a prelate were to issue a command in express opposition to this
order instituted by Our Lord, both would sin, the one commanding, and
the one obeying him, as disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he
ought not to be obeyed, because a prelate is not the judge of secret
things, but God alone is, wherefore he has no power to command anything
in respect of hidden matters, except in so far as they are made known
through certain signs, as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a
prelate can command just as a judge, whether secular or ecclesiastical,
can bind a man under oath to tell the truth.
Article 8. Whether
before the public
denunciation witnesses ought to be brought forward?
Objection 1.
It would seem that before the public denunciation witnesses ought not
to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not to be made known to
others, because by so doing "a man would betray his brother's sins
instead of correcting them," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).
Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known a brother's sin to
others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one ought not to bring
witnesses forward before the public denunciation.
Objection 2. Further,
man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no man brings in witnesses
to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore ought one to bring
forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our brother.
Objection 3. Further,
witnesses are brought forward to prove something. But witnesses afford
no proof in secret matters. Therefore it is useless to bring witnesses
forward in such cases.
Objection 4. Further,
Augustine says in his Rule that "before bringing it to the notice of
witnesses . . . it should be put before the superior." Now to bring a
matter before a superior or a prelate is to tell the Church. Therefore
witnesses should not be brought forward before the public denunciation.
On the contrary,
Our Lord said (Matthew 18:16): "Take with thee one or two more, that in
the mouth of two," etc.
I answer that, The
right way to go from one extreme to another is to pass through the
middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning of fraternal correction
to be hidden, when one brother corrects another between this one and
himself alone, while He wished the end to be public, when such a one
would be denounced to the Church. Consequently it is befitting that a
citation of witnesses should be placed between the two extremes, so
that at first the brother's sin be indicated to a few, who will be of
use without being a hindrance, and thus his sin be amended without
dishonoring him before the public.
Reply to Objection 1.
Some have understood the order of fraternal correction to demand that
we should first of all rebuke our brother secretly, and that if he
listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and his sin be altogether
hidden, they say that we should go no further in the matter, whereas if
it has already begun to reach the ears of several by various signs, we
ought to prosecute the matter, according to Our Lord's command.
But this is contrary to what Augustine says in his Rule that "we are
bound to reveal" a brother's sin, if it "will cause a worse corruption
in the heart." Wherefore we must say otherwise that when the secret
admonition has been given once or several times, as long as there is
probable hope of his amendment, we must continue to admonish him in
private, but as soon as we are able to judge with any probability that
the secret admonition is of no avail, we must take further steps,
however secret the sin may be, and call witnesses, unless perhaps it
were thought probable that this would not conduce to our brother's
amendment, and that he would become worse: because on that account one
ought to abstain altogether from correcting him, as stated above
(Article 6).
Reply to Objection 2.
A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his own sin: yet they may be
necessary that we may amend a brother's sin. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection
3. There may be three reasons for citing witnesses. First, to
show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says: secondly, to
prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine says (in his
Rule): thirdly, "to prove that the man who rebuked his brother, has
done what he could," as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx).
Reply to Objection 4.
Augustine means that the matter ought to be made known to the prelate
before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as the prelate is a
private individual who is able to be of more use than others, but not
that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as holding the
position of judge.
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